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Notes
SHINGLETON V. BUSSEY: JOINDER OF AN
INSURANCE COMPANY TO AN ACTION
AGAINST THE INSURED THROUGH
THE COURT RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
In Shingleton v. Bussey,' the Florida Supreme Court held that
the injured party may join the insurance company as a party to a
tort action against the insured arising out of an automobile acci-
dent. The majority based the decision on its rule-making authority
as formulated in the Florida Court Rules of Civil Procedure.2 The
significance of this decision is that it marks the first time a court
has joined an insurance company to an action against the insured
driver solely through its rule-making powers. This Note will ex-
plore the legal basis for joinder of insurance companies through
the court rule-making authority and analyze the policy considera-
tions affecting such joinder.
In Shingleton, the plaintiff, Bussey, attempted to join the
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company to an original action
against the insured driver, Shingleton. The trial court dismissed
those portions of the complaint which joined the insurance com-
pany, in accordance with long-standing Florida law.3 The appel-
late court reversed the decision of the trial court,4 and the state
1. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
2. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) (1969).
3. The decision overturns the Florida rule that joinder of the in-
surer is not permissible in absence of a statute or term of the insurance
policy. Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 2d 707 (1936); Thompson
v. Safeco Ins. Co., 199 So. 2d 113 (Fla. Dist. App. 1967).
4. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. App. 1969).
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supreme court affirmed the decision of the appellate court.5 The
majority stated that Rule 1.210 of the Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure0 permits the joinder of any parties who have claims or in-
terests adverse to that of the plaintiff. In deciding that joinder of
the insurer was within the scope of this rule, the court relied
heavily upon the third party beneficiary doctrine, stating that the
underlying intent of the state Financial Responsibility Law7 was to
grant persons injured in motor vehicle collisions enforceable rights
as third party beneficiaries to the insurance contract between the
insurer and the insured.8 The right of the injured party to pro-
ceed against the insurer, according to this decision, arises at the
time he becomes entitled to sue the defendant driver. The dissent
contended that such joinder violated the substantive rights of the
insurance company, and that the substantive nature of the right
placed it beyond the rule-making power of the court.
The issue raised in Shingleton is significant for two reasons.
First, if joinder of the insurer to an action against the insured is
found to be substantive, the court overstepped its authority by
encroaching upon a legislative prerogative to regulate and deter-
mine public policy for the insurance industry. Second, if the hold-
ing was correct, it could establish a precedent for other jurisdictions
to join insurance companies through their rule-making authority.9
5. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
6. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210 (a) (1969) provides that "any person may be
made a defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to that of the
plaintiff."
7. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324 et seq. (1968).
8. The court found the rationale for this decision in language quoted
from Simmon v. Iowa Mut. Cas. Co., 3 Ill. 2d 318, 121 N.E.2d 509 (1954),
which said automobile insurance
is no longer a private contract between two parties. The greater
part of litigation in our trial courts is concerned with claims aris-
ing out of property damage, personal injury or death caused by
the operation of motor vehicles. The legislatures of all our states
have recognized the hazards and perils daily encountered, and as
a result, have enacted various pieces of legislation aimed at the
protection of the injured party. Financial Responsibility Acts, Un-
satisfied Judgment Acts, and similar laws are the direct results of
this concern .... Many persons injured and disabled from auto-
mobile accidents would become public charges were it not for
financial assistance received from insurance companies.
Id. at 322, 121 N.E.2d at 511.
9. Oregon and Oklahoma have procedural statutes substantially sim-
ilar to the Florida Rules. See ORE. REv. STAT. § 13.130 (1953); OKA. STAT.
ANw. tit. 12, § 231 (1960). FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a), permits the plaintiff to
join a party if he asserts a "right to relief arising out of the same transac-
tions . . . and if any common question of law and fact common to all
these persons will arise in the transaction." The New Mexico Court in
Breeden v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 576 (1954) refused to permit
BACKGROUND
(1) StatutorV and Judicial Approaches to Joinder of the Insurer.
Until Shingleton, four approaches had been taken to the ques-
tion of joining the insurance company to an action against the in-
sured. Most jurisdictions have held, through case law, that such
joinder was not permissible in the absence of a statute or a term in
the insurance policy. 10 Another approach has been to bar joinder
of the insurer by statute." A third alternative adopted by the
courts of other states is to incorporate the non-joinder rule into
their rules of civil procedure.' 2 Two states, Wisconsin and Louisi-
ana, permit the injured party to join the insurer as part of a tort
action against the defendant drivers through the use of direct ac-
tion statutes.'
8
joinder under court rules substantially similar to FED. R. CIv. P. 20(a),
N.M. R. Crv. P. 19-101-20 (1941). Jurisdictions with substantially similar
language in their court rules or statutes include: ALASKA R. Ciy. P. 20(a)
(1968); AfIZ. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (1956); DEL. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (1968); IDAHO
R. Civ. P. 20(a) (1958); M. R, Civ. P. 20(a) (1964); Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.05(a)
(1968); MINN. R. Civ. P. 20.01 (1968); NEv. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (1967); N.D .R.
Crv. P. 20(a) (1960); PA. R. Civ. P. 2229(b) (1967).
10. See, e.g., Lloyd's London v. Blair, 262 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1958);
Arsht v. Hatton, 80 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Smith Stage Co. v. Eckert,
21 Ariz. 28, 184 P. 1001 (1919); Stearns v. Graves, 61 Idaho 232, 99 P.2d 955
(1940); Lopez v. Townsend, 37 N.M. 574, 25 P.2d 809 (1933); Fergusen v.
Mfr.'s Cas. Ins. Co., 129 Pa. Super. 276, 195 A. 661 (1938); Grey v. Houck,
167 Tenn. 233, 68 S.W.2d 117 (1934); Kurtz v. Spence, 67 S.W.2d 254 (Tex.
1934). For prior decisions in which the injured parties unsuccessfully
attempted to join insurance companies through the rules of court, see, e.g.,
Crowley v. Hartman Bros., 122 Colo. 89, 233 P.2d 1045 (1950); Breeden v.
Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 576 (1954). See also R. LONG, LAW OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20 at 3-7 (1969); J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 4861-4866 (1962); F. LEWIS, BLASHFriED AUTOMOBILE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 344.26; Annot., 96 A.L.R. 356 (1936).
11. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3030 (1967) provides:
In the original action brought by the injured person . . . the in-
surer shall not be made or joined as a party defendant, nor shall
any reference whatever be made to such insurer or to the question
of carrying such insurance during the course of the trial.
12. TEx. R. Civ. P. 51(b) (1961); IOWA R. Civ. P. 28 (1951). The Iowa
rule provides:
There shall be no joinder of an action against an indemnitor or
insurer with one against the indemnified party, unless a statute
so provides.
13. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22.655 (1959):
Such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against
both the insured and the insurer jointly and in solido ...
This right of action shall exist whether such policy contains a pro-
vision forbidding direct action, provided the accident or injury
occurred in Louisiana.
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 204.30(4), 260.11(1) (Supp. 1969). Section 204.30(4)
provides:
Any bond or policy of insurance covering liability to others by
reason of the operation of a motor vehicle shall be deemed and
constituted to contain the following conditions: That the insurer
shall be liable to the persons entitled to recover for the death of
any person, or for the injury, irrespective of whether such lia-
bility shall be in praesenti or contingent, and to become fixed as
certain by final judgment against the insured, when caused by
Notes
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Many courts prohibiting joinder of the insurer have done so
on the grounds that this would create a new right of action in favor
of the injured party.14 They observe that the liability of the de-
fendant driver arises out of the alleged tort, while any obligation
the insurance company may owe the plaintiff results from the in-
surer's contract with the driver. The liabilities are separate and
distinct. The liability of the insured driver is primary and tortious,
whereas that of the insurer is secondary and contractual. The in-
jured party has no basis for a claim against the insurer until he
establishes through proof of negligence and damages the validity of
his claim against the insured. Since there is no basis for joinder
either in contract or in tort before liability has been fixed against
the driver, the award of such a right to the injured party is to
grant him a substantive cause of action against the insured through
procedural rules.
Other courts have refused to allow joinder of the insurer on
the grounds that the jury would be unduly generous if they knew
the cost of judgment would be paid by a large, profit making en-
terprise.15 Juries would become less responsible and would allow
the negligent use or defective construction of the vehicle de-
scribed therein.
Section 260.11 (1) further provides:
The right of direct action herein given against an insurer against
liability for damages to persons other than the insured arising out
of the negligent operation . .. of a motor vehicle shall exist ...
whether or not the policy or contract of insurance contains a provi-
sion forbidding such direct action, provided the accident occurred
in Wisconsin.
14. Lloyd's London v. Blair, 262 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1958); Collins v.
Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956); Smith Stage Co. v. Eckert, 21
Ariz. 28, 184 P. 1001 (1919).
15. The argument was aptly put in Smedley v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins.
Co., 12 Wis. 2d 460, 107 N.W.2d 625 (1961):
It would be naive and contrary to trial and court experience to
say that knowledge on the part of the jury that the defendant has
insurance to cover his liability does not have some effect upon the
determination of the issue of negligence or the amount of damage.
If this were not so, defendants would not be interested in making
insurance companies defendants and insurance companies would
not be interested in keeping from the jury their identity.
Id. at 469, 107 N.W.2d at 629. See James Stewart Co. v. Newby, 266 F. 287
(4th Cir. 1920), a case which dealt with the admissibility of evidence to the
jury of insurance coverage vividly describes the alleged mental impact
of this knowledge:
The only purpose for which such evidence is presented is to preju-
dice the jury, and the poison is of such character that once being
injected into the mind, it is difficult of eradication. . . . The anec-
dote of a final instruction to disregard the testimony is ineffective.
The removal of the fly does not restore an appetite for the food
into which it has fallen.
Id. at 295.
their sympathies a wider latitude. Consequently, juries acting in
the knowlege of insurance coverage are likely to return higher
verdicts than they would ordinarily return in the absence of this
knowledge. By enlarging the obligations of the insurance com-
pany, such disclosure modifies its substantive rights.
(2) Evolution of the Insurer's Responsibility to the Injured Party
In the early part of the twentieth century, the courts were
quick to make a distinction between liability insurance and in-
demnity insurance. A policy of indemnity merely reimbursed the
insured driver for the amount of any out of pocket expenses he may
have incurred as a result of an adverse judgment. If a verdict
were entered against the insured defendant for $10,000, assuming
this to be within the limits of the policy, and if the insured were
able to pay only $500 out of his own assets, then under a policy of
indemnity the insurance company would be only required to pay
the insured driver $500. The company would have no obligation
whatsoever to the judgment creditor. The practical effect of in-
demnity policies was frequently to leave the injured person with
little or no recovery. A liability insurance policy, on the other
hand, protected the insured driver not only against actual loss, but
also against liability for such loss. When the liability of the driver
became fixed, the obligation of the insurer accrued. 16
Many states, as a corrective measure, enacted statutes, which
required the insurance company to pay the verdict to the injured
party, within the limitsof the insurance contract if the driver could
not meet the judgment.
17
Since the passage of these laws, it has become standard prac-
tice for insurance companies to insert "No Action" clauses in
their policies in order to limit, to the extent legally possible, their
obligations to the injured party. These clauses generally provide
that no action is to lie against the insurer until the insured has
16. See Pageway Coaches v. Bransford, 71 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1934) for a
good description of the distinction between liability and indemnity. See
also R. LONG, LAW OF LiABILITY INSURANCE § 20.2 (1969).
17. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(2) (West. 1955); N.Y. INSURANCE § 167
(1) (b) (McKinney 1966). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 117 (1954) is repre-
sentative of these statutes:
No policy of insurance against loss or damage resulting from
accident or injury suffered by an employee or other person and for
which the insured is liable ... shall hereafter be issued or
delivered in this state . . . unless there shall be contained within
such a policy a provision that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the
person insured shall not release the insurance company from the
payment of damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned dur-
ing the life of such policy and stating that in case execution is re-
turned unsatisfied in an action brought by the injured person ...
that an action may be maintained by the injured person...
against such corporation, under the terms of the policy, for the
amount of the judgment in the said action, not exceeding the
amount of the policy.
Notes
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complied with all the terms of the policy and judgment has been
rendered against him.' s The effect of these clauses is to bar ac-
tion against the insurance carrier until the driver has been found
liable in a separate, prior action.
Two states, Wisconsin and Louisiana, passed laws that made
the insurance company directly responsible for the injured party
even before the liability of the driver has been determined. 19 The
"Direct Action" statutes permit the injured party to join the in-
surer to an action against the insured driver. With this develop-
ment, the insurer is placed in the same legal position as the in-
sured driver, within the limits of the policy.
(3) The Rule Making Authority of the Judiciary and the Dis-
tinction Between Substance and Procedure
In the absence of a constitutional provision to the contrary,
the courts have generally held that they have the inherent power
to make rules prescribing their practice and procedure. 20 Some
legislatures grant the judiciary this power and even authorize the
court to suspend statutes which conflict with the rules of court.
21
Some courts have voided statutes which interfere with their ju-
dicial powers on the constitutional basis of separation of power.22
In Riglander v. Star Co., 28 the court stated that they were "...
not the puppets of the legislature. They are an independent branch
of government, as necessary and powerful in their sphere as
either of the great divisions. '24 On the federal level, the United
States Supreme Court relies upon its grant of authority from
18. See R. LONG, LAW OF LABIXJTY INSURANCE § 20 at 3 (1969) for a
concise background on the development of liability and indemnity insur-
ance.
19. See note 13 supra.
20. See, e.g., Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 128 N.E. 353 (1920); Hanna
v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N.Y.S. 43, aff'd, 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724
(1923); Creasy v. Commonwealth, 39 D. & C.2d (C.P. Pa. 1965) (and au-
thorities noted therein).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958); See, e.g., PA. STAT. AN. tit. 17, § 61
(1962).
22. Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 90 N.Y.S. 772, aff"d, 181
N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905) (voiding a New York law limiting the dis-
cretion of judges to try cases at term); Creasy v. Commonwealth, 39 Pa.
D. & C.2d 12 (1965) (voiding a provision of the Pennsylvania Eminent
Domain statute that required a judge to attend a viewing upon the request
of both parties).
23. 98 App. Div. 101, 90 N.Y.S. 772, aff'd, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131
(1905).
24. Id. at 105, 90 N.Y.S. at 775.
Congress.25  Since the authority granted under this statute is co-
extensive with powers considered to be inherent in the judiciary,
it has been unnecessary for the Supreme Court to decide whether
the ultimate basis for that authority resides in the Congress or the
Court.
There is a fundamental limitation on the rule-making authority
of the judiciary. It may not abridge, enlarge or modify the sub-
stantive rights of a litigant through its court rules of procedure.
26
In Florida, where Shingleton was decided, it has been held that the
source of this limitation is implicit in the provision in the Florida
constitution dealing with the separation of powers.2T Rights which
are procedural in character are within the scope of the rule-making
authority and can therefore be effected through the court rules of
civil procedure. The employment of the court rules of civil proce-
dure to modify a substantive right would be an abuse of the rule-
making authority of the court.
The question as to whether the court exceeded its rule-making
authority turns upon the distinction between procedure and sub-
stance. Those matters which relate to the existence of a right or
liability are considered substantive, while those which concern
the mode of its enforcement are procedural. 28 The rules of civil
procedure may regulate the matter if it responds to the question
25. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965); 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)
provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules . . . the practice and procedure of the district courts of the
United States in court actions .... Such rules shall not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive rights. . . . All laws in con-
flict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect.
26. See, e.g., Heat Pump Equip. Co. v. Glen Alden Corp., 93 Ariz. 361,
380 P.2d 1016 (1963); Cohee v. Ritchey, 150 A.2d 830 (Del. Super. 1959)
(capacity to sue is procedural, therefore a proper subject for court rules);
Muntz v. Lester, 32 1MI. App. 2d 265, 177 N.E.2d 419 (1961); Lunsford v.
Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. App. 1969) (power for court to take
away a person's liberty can not originate from rule making authority);
State v. Michael, 237 A.2d 782 (Md. App. 1968) (criminal statutes of
limitations could not be established under rule-making authority granted
by Maryland constitution for purpose of regulating practice and pro-
cedure); Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. App. 1964); Estate of Dauer
v. Zabel, 9 Mich. App. 176, 156 N.W.2d 34 (1967) (manner and time for
demanding a trial by jury is procedural within the meaning of the Michi-
gan constitution, hence a proper exercise of court rule-making power);
Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950); Beall v. Reidy, 80
N.M. 444, 457 P.2d 376 (1960) (right to disqualify judges is substantive
and cannot be effected through the court rules of civil procedure); Gair v.
Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43 (1959) (regulation of contingent fees by
court rule); In re Templeton, 399 Pa. 10, 159 A.2d 725 (1960) (substantive
right of taxpayers to intervene could not be abrogated by a rule of the
supreme court).
27. State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
28. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965). See also Sedler, The
Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict
of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 813, 817 (1962).
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of how but not what-if it controls the means rather than the end.
29
It must be borne in mind that rules of procedure frequently affect
substantive rights. The availability of a rule permitting service
of process by publication, or rules requiring a plaintiff to give se-
curity for costs are examples of rules of procedure that under
certain circumstances affect the substantive rights of the parties
since their presence or absence may determine the outcome of a
particular case.30
The United States Supreme Court has observed that the "line
between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context
changes." 31 Furthermore, the Court has asserted that when there
is uncertainty as to whether a given matter is procedural or sub-
stantive, the court may consider the matter procedural. 82 If the
application of the joinder rule merely affects the judicial process
for enforcing the rights of the injured person and the duties of the
insurer rather than those rights and duties themselves, the holding
of the Florida court would be sound. If there is reasonable doubt
whether such joinder is procedural or substantive, the court may
declare the matter to be procedural even if in some instances
joinder has a substantive affect upon the rights of the parties.
(4) The Direct Action Statutes
Since Louisiana and Wisconsin accomplished through legisla-
tions3 what the Shingleton court effected through its rule-making
authority, a brief discussion of the procedural history of these
statutes is pertinent. With the exception of West v. Monroe
Bakery34 the Louisiana courts have consistently characterized their
statute as procedural. 5 Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v.
Dennis Sheen Transfer Company8 held that the statute did not
increase the substantial obligations of the insurer under the con-
tract. It said the Louisiana statute, which permitted the injured
party to proceed against the insurer in case of the insolvency of
the insured, established the duty of the insurance company. The
29. See Ailes, Substance and Procedure, 39 MICH. L. REv. 392, 405
(1941).
30. Id. at 408-09.
31. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
32. Id. at 472.
33. See note 13 supra.
34. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
35. Vowell v. Mfr.'s Cas. Co., 279 La. 798, 86 So. 2d 909 (1956); Home
Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 222 La. 540, 62 So. 2d 828 (1952);
Churchman v. Ingram, 56 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1952).
36. 18 La. App. 725, 138 So. 183 (1931).
direct action statute merely determined the manner in which the
rights and obligations would be enforced.
The federal courts have interpreted the statute as creating a
substantive right.s 7 In Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. El-
bert,38 the United States Supreme Court permitted application of
the statute on the grounds that it created a substantive right. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Collins v. Automobile
Insurance Co.3 9 viewed the ruling as committing the Supreme Court
to a substantive interpretation of the statute, "for if the matter
were only procedural, it would have been improper for the federal
court to conform its practice thereto."40 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, pointed out that it was merely conforming to what it deemed
to be the Louisiana view. The Court cited the Louisiana holding in
West v. Monroe Bakery,41 the one decision in which Louisiana
termed the statute substantive. However, subsequent Louisiana
decisions have held the joinder statute to be procedural. 42  The
Supreme Court, therefore, has not undertaken to independently
interpret the effect of direct action statutes, it has merely fol-
lowed what it believed to be the Louisiana holding. It would be
misleading to place too much weight on an analogy of the Shingleton
rationale with the contrary holdings of the lower federal courts,
since what is substantive for the purpose of diversity may be
procedural for the purpose of local law. A state court, in order
to characterize its own law in terms of procedure or substance,
must only distinguish the enforcement of the right from the right
itself. The federal courts must also take into account the possible
effect of local discrimination and the need to eliminate the advan-
tages of forum-shopping. 48 They would classify the rule in a way
that would further their objective of achieving the same outcome
as though the case were tried in the state court.
44
37. See, e.g., Collins v. Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956);
Fisher v. Home Indem. Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952); Soileau v. New
Amsterdam, 167 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1948); Chambless v. Nat'l Indus. Laun-
dries, 149 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Tex. 1957). The federal courts had originally
accorded the statute a procedural interpretation, see, Wells v. American
Employer's Ins. Co., 132 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1943).
38. 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
39. 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956).
40. Id. at 419.
41. 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
42. See cases cited note 35 supra.
43. See Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 813, 818-821 (1962).
44. It should be noted that there are other approaches for deciding
whether to utilize conflicts of law principles. The United States Supreme
Court in Watson v. Employer's Liab. Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), upheld
the application of the statute in a diversity case on the basis that the
substantial impact of the statute related to Louisiana. Other courts, re-
lying on York v. Guar. Trust, 326 U.S. 64 (1949), recognize that what is
procedural for the purposes of local law may be substantive for the pur-




The Wisconsin statute is divided into two sections. Section
204.30(4), which grants the right of the injured party to proceed
against the insurer,45 the Wisconsin courts have called substan-
tive.46 Section 260.11(1), which provides for joinder of the insurer
before the liability of the driver has been fixed,47 they have called
procedural. 48 The federal courts have characterized both parts of
the statute as conferring a substantive right.49 There are no funda-
mental differences in the interpretations accorded either the
Louisiana or the Wisconsin direct action statutes.
In conclusion, there is judicial precedent in Louisiana and
Wisconsin for categorizing joinder of insurance companies as con-
ferring a procedural right. The contrary federal holdings should
be viewed in the context of the differing goals which must be
taken into account in cases involving diversity.
LEGAL BASIS FOR JOINDER OF THE INSURER THROUGH COURT
RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY
(1) Joinder Involves the Manner of Enforcing a Prior Established
Right
Most courts have held that the liability of the insurance com-
pany is contractual since it has no obligation to compensate either
the driver or the injured party until the liability of the driver is
established. These courts assert that there is no basis for a con-
nection between the insurer and the injured party unless and until
adverse judgment is rendered against the insured driver. These
courts conclude that allowing the injured plaintiff to proceed
against the insurance company before judgment is rendered against
the insured driver is to create a new right of action, a right which
they deem to be substantive. 0
The key phrase in this approach is "until the liability of the
insured driver is established." Once the liability of the insured is
fixed, the insurance company is obligated to meet the judgment.
In several states this obligation is imposed by statutes which re-
quire the insurer to provide as part of the insurance contract that
the insolvency of the driver shall not release the insurance com-
pany from payment of damages within the limits of the policy.51
45. See note 13 supra.
46. Frye v. Angst, 28 Wis. 275, 137 N.W.2d 430 (1965).
47. See note 13 supra.
48. Frye v. Angst, 28 Wis. 575, 137 N.W.2d 430 (1965).
49. Swanson v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Dl. 1967).
50. See cases cited note 14 supra.
51. See note 17 supra.
This law determines both the rights of the injured party and the
duties of the company. If any substantive right is created, it is
created by a statute of this nature. The joinder issue then raises
the question of when may the injured party proceed against the
insurer, or, in effect, how may the right be enforced. This is the
language of procedure, not of substance. In those instances where
joinder would effect the difference between liability or nonlia-
bility, recovery or no recovery, a substantive right would be in-
volved. Where such joinder has no appreciable affect upon these
rights, as is the case with most insurance contracts, the argument
for a substantive right seems much less convincing.
Shingleton relied upon the third party beneficiary theory to es-
tablish the right and subsequently applied its rules of procedure
to regulate the manner of enforcing this right.5 2 The court was
compelled to use this approach because Florida does not have a
statute that provides for the ultimate liability of the insurance
company. The court instead relied upon its financial responsibility
law which requires motorists to have specified financial assets to
pay the cost of a judgment.53  The court stated that the legisla-
tive intent of the statute was to benefit the innocent drivers who
may be injured through the tortious conduct of a financially in-
solvent motorist, and that by virtue of this legislative intent, the
injured party gained enforceable rights to the contract between the
insurer and the insured driver.54 It is important to note that the
court has established the duty of the insurance company and the
right of the injured party, not through the rules of civil procedure,
but through its interpretation of a statute. The court then applied
its rules of procedure to enforce the rights and obligations imposed,
in its opinion, by the financial responsibility statute. 55 The Florida
court, therefore, properly exercised its rule-making authority to
join the insurer, since it was regulating the manner of a right that
it found to exist in substantive law.
In summation, the source of the obligation lies in the financial
responsibility and insolvency of insured statutes. The obligation
arises whenever the driver and the insurer enter into an insurance
contract which is within the scope of these statutes. A rule govern-
ing the judicial enforcement of this obligation would appear to be
procedural.
(2) Analogy of the Joinder of the Insurer to the Joinder of the
Master through Respondeat Superior
Most jurisdictions have held that a master may be joined in
52. 223 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 1969).
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324 et seq. (1968) contains the Florida Finan-
cial Responsibility Law.
54. 223 So. 2d 713, 719 (Fla. 1969).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324 et seq. (1968); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a)
(1969) contains the permissive joinder rule.
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an action against the servant where his liability rests upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior.56 Many courts formerly refused to
allow such joinder on the grounds that the servant was primarily
liable and the master secondarily liable.57 The rationale underly-
ing the doctrine of respondeat superior is that the master who
profits from the act of the servant should thereby stand ready to
compensate those injured through the torts of the servant. 58
There appears to be no important reason why joinder of an
insurance company should be deemed a matter of substance, while
joinder of the employer is considered question of procedure.
Neither the insurer nor the master are at fault. The obligations
of both are contingent upon the liability of another, and their sole
connection with the injured party is their relationship to the
wrongdoer. Ultimately that relationship is based upon a contract-
in one instance the insurance contract, in the other the terms of
employment.
It is true that the master has a right of indemnity against the
servant, while an insurance company has no comparable right
against the driver. Implicit in this distinction is the suggestion
that because the master has a right of reimbursement against the
servant, he has suffered no loss and, hence, no substantive right is
involved. It is doubtful that this "right" carries sufficient weight
to justify the distinction, since in practice such right is ordinarily
a hollow one. If the employee were in a position to indemnify his
employer, he would, under normal circumstances, have been able
to pay the judgment. If erring servants could compensate those
they have injured, there would be no need for the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. The insurance company acquires its policy-
holders, it profits, and indeed, its very existence from the fact that
it does not insist upon indemnification from the insured. The in-
ability to seek indemnifcation from the driver can hardly be labeled
a disadvantage vis-a-vis the employer.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the employer is any
less prejudiced than the insurance company by the jury's aware-
ness of his presence. In both instances, the jury knows there is a
deeper pocket prepared to meet their verdict. The potential preju-
dice to the employer might even be greater because his liability is
56. See Daniel v. Parker, 119 Vt. 348, 126 A.2d 85 (1956) for an
excellent historical analysis of master-servant joinder under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. See also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1066 (1958).
57. See Willis, Joinder of Master and Servant, 23 Omo ST. L. REv. 488,
493 (1962).
58. RESTATEmENT (SEcoNI) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
unlimited. He must be prepared to pay whatever amount the
jury returns. The insurance company must meet only that portion
of the verdict that falls within the limits of the policy. This places
an upper limit on the degree of any possible prejudice that he may
suffer. There appears to be no compelling reason to treat the
joinder of insurance companies in a manner different from that
of employers.
POLICY BASIS FOR JOINDER OF THE INSURED
(1) Joinder will not Materially Affect the Outcome of the Case
It is submitted that the underlying basis for the refusal to
join insurers in the absence of statute is primarily for reasons of
policy rather than law. It is further submitted that the courts
will continue to utilize the argument that they lack authority to
permit such joinder until they become convinced that public policy
is better served by such joinder. Since the policy and the legal
elements are so inseparably entangled, this Note will analyze both.
The primary policy objection to joinder lies in the fear that
the jury will be unduly prejudiced by the knowledge of the in-
surer's interest. The courts are unlikely to seriously consider the
legal basis for joinder until they conclude that such joinder will
not be prejudicial and that it will facilitate court procedure. The
degree of prejudice, if any, actually caused by the disclosure of the
insurer's interest is largely a matter of speculation. While no con-
vincing evidence has been brought forth to support the contention
that joinder of the insurance company results in inflated verdicts,
there has been some evidence, admittedly fragmentary, that dis-
closure does not greatly affect the insurer's interest.
One of the most comprehensive studies of jury awards has
found that jury verdicts in Louisiana and Wisconsin, the two
states allowing joinder, are not particularly high by the standards
of other states. This study somewhat dispels the notion that
joinder of the insurer with the driver results in awards that are
substantially out of line with those in jurisdictions where joinder is
not permitted.50
The alleged prejudice to the insurer accrues from the jury's
awareness of his interest. It would follow from this that many of
the arguments relevant to the rule of evidence on the inadmissi-
bility of insurance coverage, would be also applicable to the joinder
question. In most jurisdictions disclosure of the insurer's interest
is prejudicial error and grounds for a new trial. 0 Essentially the
59. See M. BELLI, 4 MODERN TRIALS §§ 98, 191 (Supp. 1966). Belli's
analysis deals with all damage claims while the scope of this Note is limited
to automobile injury actions. This supplement indicates a rise in verdict
returns in Louisiana and Wisconsin, but also reveals this to be the trend in
many other states as well.
60. The general rule is that in the absence of special circumstances,
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policy basis for prohibiting joinder is similar to that barring the
admissibility of evidence concerning insurance coverage. As to
this "policy" McCormick states:
Under the pressure of more and more stringent financial
responsibility laws, the practice of securing insurance pro-
tection against liability is rapidly becoming almost uni-
versal. . . . When the rule against disclosure first origi-
nated, doubtless the existence of such protection for de-
fendants was exceptional. But when we consider the ways
in which the fact of insurance may be properly disclosed
in evidence or suggested at the beginning of the final
examination of the jurors, and the fact that insurance has
become the usual rather than the exceptional, it seems
likely today in nearly all cases, the jury will either be
informed of the fact of insurance or will consciously as-
sume that the defendant is so protected.61
There are a variety of trial situations in which counsel for
the injured party may have the opportunity to bring the matter
of insurance coverage to the attention of the jury. Such evidence
may be introduced to prove a fact in the case,6 2 or it may be rele-
vant as bearing on the credibility of a witness.63 Voluntary re-
sponses concerning the driver's insurance company are usually
not grounds for prejudicial error.64 In the pre-trial examination
of prospective jurors, counsel for the injured party can frequently
bring the fact of insurance coverage to the attention of prospective
jurors. The counsel for the injured plaintiff may question pro-
spective jurors concerning their connections or interest in a lia-
evidence that the defendant carries insurance is inadmissible, see Annot.,
4 A.L.R.2d 761, 767 (1949). It is significant that the courts have shown
some tendency to relax enforcement of this rule by their refusal to re-
verse as prejudicial error cases where such evidence has been admitted.
Id. at 764. See also, Smith, The Miscegenetic Union of Liability Insurance
and the Tort Process in the Personal Injury System, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
645, 682-86 (1969).
61. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 168 at 357 (1954).
62. See, e.g., Toppass v. Perkins, 268 Ky. 186, 104 S.W.2d 423 (1937)
(misrepresentation by defendant of inability to meet judgment in or-
der to obtain a release); Layton v. Cregan Mallory Co., 263 Mich. 30,
248 N.W. 539 (1933) (where ownership of the car was denied); Heischen-
son v. Weisman, 80 N.H. 557, 119 A. 705 (1923) (driver's statement, "Don't
worry, I got insurance," was admissible as tending to reveal an attitude less
likely to demonstrate the proper degree of care).
63. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Goldstein Bros. Amusement Co., 231 Mass.
461, 121 N.E. 429 (1919) (physicians who examined the injured party were
required to testify that they were employed to do so by an insurance
company).
64. See C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 168 at 357 (1954); Cain v. Kohl-
mman, 344 Pa. 63, 22 A.2d 667 (1941) (witness being examined by the court
blurted cut information showing insurance coverage).
bility insurance company.6 5 Thus, an alert counsel for the in-
jured party may legitimately convey the fact of insurance coverage
to the jury in a variety of ways.
With today's universal insurance coverage, the jury may as-
sume coverage regardless of disclosure, and by extension regard-
less of joinder, in which case any alleged prejudicial effect will
occur whether such joinder is permitted or barred. With increasing
frequency courts have become more outspoken in their criticism of
the non-disclosure rule. These courts are questioning the prag-
matic effect of such non-disclosure in concealing the fact of in-
surance coverage from the jury.6 6 Their criticism pertains equally
well to the matter of joinder of the insurance company.
Furthermore, there are additional checks upon the jury. The
court has the power to set aside verdicts that it believes to be un-
reasonable and excessive.67 There is also the restraining force of
self-interest. Members of the jury pay insurance premiums. In-
surance companies have gone to great expense to inform the pub-
lic of the link between high verdicts and increased insurance pre-
mium payments. The awareness on the part of the individual juror
that he will be called upon to bear a portion of the verdict serves
as a sobering countercheck to any unreasonably generous impul-
ses.
68
Joinder would not place any additional burden upon the in-
surance company since in most instances the company has already
assumed command of the defense:
Under the familiar forms of liability insurance policies,
the defense action against the insured is wholly con-
trolled by the insurer; it selects and pays the attorneys,
picks the witnesses, determines whether to compromise
65. See, e.g., Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 793 (1949); Smith, The Miscegene-
tic Union of Liability Insurance and the Tort Process in the Personal
Injury System, 54 CoRNELL L. REV. 645, 684 (1969).
66. Typical of the rising frequency of criticism being directed at he
non-disclosure rule are the comments of the Indiana appellate court in
Rust v. Watson, 215 N.E.2d 42 (Ind. App. Ct. 1966):
It should be noted that such prejudice arose via the case law in the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The continued recogni-
tion of such presumed prejudice can be seriously questioned today.
Even if the prejudice has not ceased, it can be questioned whether
the good limitation of such inquiries has any pragmatic effect in
concealing from the jury the fact that the defendant is insured.
Id. at 53. See, e.g., Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel Inc., 93
Ariz. 60, 378 P.2d 741 (1963); Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 275,
330 P.2d 462, 472 (1958) (the court bluntly called for "reappraisal of the
insurance bugaboo."); Runnacles v. Doddrell, 59 N.J. Super. 363, 127 A.2d
836 (1960).
67. See, e.g., 25A C.J.S. Damages § 196 (1966); Causey v. Cornelius,
164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 330 P.2d 463 (1958).
68. See People v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 317, 282
P.2d 559 (1955) for examples of advertisements placed in national maga-
zines by insurance companies in attempts to make jurors aware of the re-
lationship between high verdicts and high premiums.
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the case through its own attorneys and agents [it] con-
ducts the trial throughout, likewise conducts any appeal
and pays any final judgment up to the limit of the cov-
erage.6 9
It would therefore appear that informing the jury of the in-
surer's interest would not materially prejudice the insurance com-
pany. First, there is reason to believe that jurors assume such
coverage even in the absence of specific disclosure, and, in any
event, there are a variety of techniques for conveying the idea of
insurance to the jury. Second, there is no convincing evidence of
substantially higher damage awards in jurisdictions allowing di-
rect action. Third, the courts can control unreasonable verdicts
through their power of remittur. Fourth, there is a growing aware-
ness among motorists, and presumably jurors, of the relationship
between high damage awards and high insurance premium rates.
(2) The Procedural Advantages Acquired through Joinder of the
Insurer
It is inaccurate to assert in the manner of some courts that the
only motive behind the desire to join the insurer is to inflate
damage awards.7 0 One of the primary objectives of modern pro-
cedure is the adjudication of all claims arising out of a transaction
in a single trial.7' The insurance company may have defenses aris-
ing out of the contract with the insured which, if upheld, will bar
recovery for the injured party. Without joinder, these defenses
must be tried in a separate action after the liability of the driver
has been determined. This contributes unnecessarily to the back-
log of the courts. 72 It also may entail an additional hardship for the
plaintiff by prolonging his wait for a recovery for several addi-
tional years.
Simmon v. Iowa Mutual Casualty Co.75 typifies the way in
69. Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 276, 330 P.2d 462, 472
(1958).
70. See R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20.2 (1969).
71. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (a); Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713
(Fla. 1969); cases cited note 10 supra.
72. See Rosenberg and Savern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal
Injury Litigation, 59 COL. L. REv. 1115 (1969) where the authors state that
personal injury claims, much of them arising out of automobile accidents,
are responsible for much of the backlog. These personal injury actions
amounted to nearly 60% of all claims in 1958. When the equity cases are
not taken into account, many of which deal with uncontested matrimonial
actions dealt with by masters, the personal injury claims increase to 84% of
the total cases. The courts have a strong interest in eliminating unneces-
sary duplication of actions in these claims, wherever possible. Id. at 1117.
73. 3 M1. 318, 121 N.E.2d 509 (1954).
which the non-joinder rule frustrates the objectives of modern
civil procedure and results in inequities. The injured party ob-
tained a judgment against the driver for $7,000. Execution on the
judgment was returned showing the defendant to be without as-
sets. The plaintiff thereupon brought action against the insurance
company. The insurer claimed that according to the policy, the
driver was required to give the company notice. If the notice were
insufficient, the insurer would have been released from his ob-
ligations under the contract. The injured party eventually pre-
vailed, but was required to undergo another time consuming ac-
tion which suspended the outcome of the litigation for several addi-
tional years. The court had to set aside time which could have
been more profitably spent on other claims. The rights of other
litigants awaiting trial were correspondingly affected. The injured
party, in all likelihood was being pressed for payment of expenses
arising out of the accident.7 4 Other defenses that the insurer
may have against the insured, and which may be raised against the
judgment creditor, include breach of the cooperation clause, 75 and
cancellation of the policy.
76
74. See, e.g., Young v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1941)
(failure of insured to provide insurer with timely notice does not defeat
claim against insurer in the absence of a forfeiture clause); George v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 121 Neb. 647, 238 N.W. 36 (1931); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 216 P.2d 606 (1950) (four months
delay by insured in providing notice of accident released insurer); Rushing
v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 302, 167 N.E. 450 (1929) (insurer
released by delay in notice of claim by insured though such delay not
prejudicial); Gerber v. Fletcher, 108 Pa. 226, 164 A. 135 (1933) (failure to
give prompt notice defeats claim against insured even though policy does
not contain forfeiture clause).
75. See, e.g., Beam v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.
1959) (finding by trial court that insured's refusal to attend trial was a
substantial breach was affirmed, but failure of insurer to include in insur-
ance contract a reservation of rights clause, resulted in insurer waiving
its rights when it defended despite knowledge of such breach); Emery v.
Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 663, 67 P.2d 1046 (1937) (false state-
ment concerning previous insurance policy voided the policy); Northwest-
ern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Independence Mut. Ins. Co., 319 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. App.
1959) (unnecessary that insurer be prejudiced by breach of cooperation
clause, merely that the breach be substantial; failure by insured to attend
trial, send timely notice, and to come to insurer's office when requested
held not to be a substantial breach); Kindevater v. Motorists Cas. Ins. Co.,
120 N.J.L. 373, 199 A. 606 (1938) (admission of liability by insured without
consent of insurer released insurer of liability); Pearl Assur. Co. v. Watts,
58 N.J. Super. 83, 150 A.2d 725 (1960) (inconsistent statements by hus-
band and wife, insureds, under homeowner liability policy, made to insurer
found a failure to make frank disclosure, thereby, a breach of cooperation
clause releasing insurer); Luntz v. Stern, 135 Ohio 225, 20 N.E.2d 241 (1939)
(refusal of insured to sign answer prepared by insurer, breach of cooper-
ation clause); Crook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.
2d 241 (1960) (insured giving statement of facts concerning circumstances
of accident to injured party, held, breach of cooperation clause but did not
defeat claim by injured party since it did not cause insurer prejudicial
damage).
76. See, e.g., Panizzi v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 600 (3d
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It is essential to note that whether the insurer defends or
treats the contract as breached and refuses to defend has no bear-
ing on the procedural inconvenience inflicted on the plaintiff and
on the court, nor is it relevant which party utlimately pre-
vails. In either event, if the tortfeasor is judgment proof, a separate,
subsequent action must be instituted against the insurance com-
pany to discover whether the company has a defense against the
driver sufficient to relieve the company of its contractual obliga-
tion.
Modern rules of procedure were enacted to curtail such abuses
of process. A rule of joinder which produces these abuses should
be revised in the absence of strong countervailing considerations.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that Shingleton was correct in its joinder of the
insurance company through the court rules of civil procedure.
Procedure is concerned with enforcing obligations existing in sub-
stantive law. The court discovered this obligation from the judi-
cial construction of a statute and it thereupon employed its rule-
making authority to regulate the manner of enforcing this obliga-
tion. Most courts have already adopted this practice with respect
to joinder of employees despite the fact that the two situations are
not dissimilar. There is no strong evidence that such joinder seri-
ously prejudices the insurer, while on the other hand, permitting
such joinder would promote the goals of modern procedure by per-
mitting an adjudication of all the issues arising out of a transaction
at a single trial. The United States Supreme Court has said that if
a "matter is rationally capable of classification as either procedure
or substance, the court has the authority to regulate the matter as
procedural. ' 77 At the very least, joinder of the insurer to an ac-
tion against the insured driver falls into this category.
EDWARD C. HussIE
Cir. 1967); Austin v. New Brunswick Fidelity Ins. Co., 110 Mont. 192, 108
P.2d 1036 (1940); Finkleberg v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 126 Wash. 543,
219 P. 12 (1923).
77. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
